In his book ‘A peace to end all peace’, David Fromkin sets out to describe in details the history of the creation of the modern Middle East, focusing on the short period of time between the beginning of the First World War and 1922.

When the Central powers collapsed in Autumn 1918, the war had lasted 4 years and the Allied were caught unprepared, having only recently changed their mind in regard to the length of the war, expecting it to go well into 1919 and even 1920. Notwithstanding, from January to June 1919, the 4 Allied powers (UK, France, Italy and the USA) set out to establish the first modern peace in the aftermath of the most bloody and destructive conflict Europe had known in recent centuries.

In his book 1914-1918, David Stevenson offers a powerful, detailed, insightful yet concise history of the Great War. He divides the war into 3 parts: the outbreak in early 1914, with rapid troop movement; the escalation from 1915 until late 1917, during which the opponents desperately sought to break through the stalemate; and the outcome in 1918, with Germany’s last push and its following collapse.

That history is written by the winner is a rather well established fact. But it is still amazing how many people still fall into pre-packaged narratives. In his book “The Sleepwalkers”, Christopher Clark sets out to dispel the myth of German aggressiveness and European victimhood.

As historians studying the First World War mostly focused on the political relationships between states and their policy makers leading to the war, making it sometimes difficult to grasp accurately what these various actors were actually feeling and in which context they were evolving.

The massive changes brought by democracy, capitalism, and industrialization upon the centre of the world, acutely felt by its conservative elite, are first described before addressing the various crisis that led to the conflict.

“Oscillant entre un nationalisme arrogant et une étonnante discrétion dans le concert des nations, elle émet des signaux contradictoires pour l’opinion internationale. Machiavélisme de ses dirigeants? Crainte de réveiller le fantôme des années Mao? Ou, plus prosaïquement, absence de vision d’une élite avant tout préoccupée par ses problèmes?”

“As is made clear in the introduction, the author makes no attempt to expound any grand theory or “overarching theme” for contemporary European history, aiming to avoid narrative fallacies by plainly retelling the entire scope of European history in that period, to let what themes do exist become self-apparent.”

Here are a few talks by Nassim Nicholas Taleb on his new book, Antifragile. Even though they seem to all sound and look the same, the non-intuitive idea of antifragility is discussed in a variety of contexts with many examples as well as sometimes very interesting and challenging interviewers.

“As the economic collapse of 2008 made clear, the social contract that defined postwar life in Europe and America-the guarantee of security, stability, and fairness-is no longer guaranteed; in fact, it’s no longer part of the common discourse. (…) In reintroducing alternatives to the status quo, Judt invigorates our political conversation, furnishing the tools necessary to imagine a new form of governance and a better way of life.”

“La crise de la finance globalisée a été lourde de conséquences pour les États des pays développés. Afin d’éviter un effondrement de l’activité, ils ont accepté, à la fin des années 2000, de laisser leurs déficits budgétaires se creuser. Ce faisant, ils ont aussi jeté les germes d’une autre crise, celle des dettes souveraines.”

“Pourquoi les “décideurs” français sont-ils incapables, depuis trente ans, d’élaborer une politique économique cohérente ? Et savent-ils jusqu’où, à ce jeu dangereux, ils peuvent aller trop loin?”